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Thomas M. Madden*

Significance and the Materiality Tautology

I. Introduction
The lack of a bright line test for materiality in securities fraud actions is
not new.1 It now appears that perhaps the most likely opportunity for a bright line
standard came and went with the Supreme Court’s Matrixx decision.2
Commentators on the consequences to the business of securities fraud class actions
have moved on to Halliburton3 and Amgen.4 Yet, for those of us concerned with the
general understanding of materiality in private 10b-5 actions, Matrixx has reminded
us of a terrible fog.
Putting aside for now the narrower discussions of materiality as a class
certification issue, and materiality as a function of fraud on the market reliance and
causality, Matrixx has left us with a fundamental void in defining materiality. The
terrible fog is the very definition of materiality.
Materiality is a lynchpin element in a private cause of action brought for
securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “‘34
Act” or “Exchange Act”)5 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or “SEC”).6 Whether
© 2015 Thomas M. Madden
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1. Donald C. Langevoort, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: The Future of Class
Actions: Lies without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 933
(2012) (“[Matrixx] passed on an opportunity to rein in the otherwise fact-intensive approach to materiality on
which defense motions to dismiss often stumble, and applied the heightened pleading requirement for scienter
fairly liberally.”). See also Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces of Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517 (2013); James
th
D. Cox, 19 Annual Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference: The Economics of Aggregate Litigation:
Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719 (2013)
(focusing on causation and the fraud on the market theory).
2. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
3. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
4. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
5. Securities Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2012)).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
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information disclosed, misrepresented or withheld is material goes to the crux of
the policy behind Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.7 That policy generally is to
promote fair and efficient, fully informed markets in which the public can make
investment decisions.8 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the grant of
authority given to the SEC by Congress in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).9 “By that Act Congress proposed to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions
generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges.”10 If
material information is misrepresented to the marketplace or is traded on by a
select few without being disclosed, the policy will not be met.11
A major source of redress for violations of Rule 10b-5 is, of course, the implied
private right of action. Private actions under Rule 10b-5 are often brought as class
actions,12 and, if so, are subject to the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995,13 as amended (the “PSLRA”) requiring pleading with
particularity—a higher standard intended to reduce frivolous claims.14

exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”).
7. I will refer principally to Rule 10b-5 and sometimes to Rule 10b-5 or Section 10(b) interchangeably,
but it should be understood that this Rule invokes Section 10(b) more generally. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
8. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39–40 (3d ed. 2003).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
10. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1968).
11. For a specific discussion of 10b5-1 plans, see Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and Insiders’
Incentive to Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313 (2010). For a discussion on insider trading and the policy of
private actions, see generally Robert A. Prentice & Dain Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 1 (2010).
12. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465 (2004) (discussing
the benefit of the class action regime and contemplating its application in Korea); see also Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (arguing that “differential
indemnification rights, insurance policy exclusions, and plaintiffs’ counsel as the real party-in-interest create
powerful incentives for settlement”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do
Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Action?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855–65 (2002)
(examining the role of institutional investors in both prosecuting securities class actions and filing claims in
class settlements post-PSLRA).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). See also Fed. R. Civ. 9(b).
14. See Joseph De Simone, Matthew D. Ingber & Evan A. Creutz, Practitioner Note: Asher to Asher and Dust
to Dust: the Demise of the PSLRA Safe Harbor?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 799 (2005); see also Cox & Thomas, supra
note 12, at 855–65 (examining the role of institutional investors in both prosecuting securities class actions and
filing claims in class settlements post-PSLRA); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc., Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 276 n.8
(3d Cir. 2006) (“The purpose of the heightened pleading requirements contained in the PSLRA is to restrict
abuses in securities class-action litigation.”); Greebel v. FTP Software, 194 F.3d 185, 191 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The
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To prevail in a private action for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff
must successfully show that: (1) a defendant made a material misrepresentation or
omission, (2) that the defendant acted with scienter,15 (3) a connection exists
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security,
(4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or omission,16 (5) the plaintiff
consequently suffered economic loss, and (6) the defendant’s material
misrepresentation or omission caused an economic loss to the plaintiff (“loss
causation”).17
Our concern, at a time when our Supreme Court remains interested in Rule 10b5, is with the crucial materiality element, and, more particularly, with recent
decisions regarding the usage and meaning of “significance” in finding materiality.18

II. Significance and Materiality
Determining materiality involves “a mixed question of law and fact.”19 Under Basic
v. Levinson,20 a decision maker must disclose information where “a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the [would be] omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.”21
This article addresses the usage and meaning of forms of “significance” and
their, or its, linkage to the determination of materiality in deciding whether to
disclose is tied to disclosure and liability under Rule 10b-5.22 Moreover, it explores
whether the usage and meaning of forms of “significance” existing in precedent and
determinative of decision making on materiality, have been altered in view of the

enactment of the PSLRA in 1995 marked a bipartisan effort to curb abuse in private securities lawsuits,
particularly the filing of strike suits.”); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 544, 556 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
15. “[A] mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. . . .” Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). See also Michael J. Kaufman, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection
Conference: Foreword: Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1323 (2013); Barbara
Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
1493 (2013).
16. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the reliance element, see Robert A. Prentice,
Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611 (2008).
17. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.
v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008); see also Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Economics Applied: Loss Causation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.
REV. 1509 (2013).
18. Through emphasizing precedent in private actions, this analysis also draws upon instructive
discussions of materiality in criminal and civil cases.
19. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
20. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
21. Id. at 231–32.
22. See infra Parts II.A, B.
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Supreme Court’s recent Matrixx decision.23 Is significance (or has it become) simply
synonymous with materiality in the context of disclosure decisions under Rule 10b5? If not, how is it distinguished? Is its usage simply a consequence of the occasional
inadequacy of language?
So too, the very vantage point from which we view materiality, and perhaps
significance, and what constitutes each, lies at the heart of Rule 10b-5 actions and
securities law policy generally.24 In deciding whether and exactly how much to
disclose, materiality, and perhaps significance, may be determined ex ante, but it
can only be verified as correctly made ex post facto, and then it is fraught with bias
and unfairness. The very phrasing and tense of the guiding language from Basic
(“would have been”) captures this ex post retrospection to the ex ante decision and
encapsulates the difficulty of judging that decision fairly.25 Therefore, our look at
significance and materiality requires us to grapple with the ex ante versus ex post
problem inherent in finding materiality.
Moreover, because the role of materiality is also essential in Basic’s finding that
the element of reliance may be assumed in causation with the adoption of the
fraud-on-the-market theory and because the ex post factor is also palpable in that
analysis,26 we consider the ex ante versus ex post problem with materiality in
applying the fraud-on-the-market theory and the closely allied efficient capital
markets hypothesis.
A. Forms of “Significant”
1. Basic, TSC, and Mills
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision on materiality under Rule 10b-5, Basic v.
Levinson, pertained to pre-merger negotiations and the determination of when
information about such negotiations constitutes material information necessary to
be disclosed under the “significantly” altering the “total mix” of information
standard.27 While the Court sought to resolve a split in the circuits over the
relatively narrow issue of pre-merger talks, Basic subsequently became the primary
23.

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
For a discussion of the SEC’s historic treatment of the materiality element in 10b-5 actions; albeit
focusing on the PSLRA, forward looking statements and the bespeaks caution doctrine, see Hugh C. Beck, The
Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate Predictions, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 161 (2007); E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., The
Alternative-Action Requirement: The Derailment of Santa Fe, 1981 DUKE L.J. 963, 972 (1981) (“Since the
inception of an implied civil cause of action for a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 . . . the test for
materiality has ranged from a realistic view to a reasonable man standard to a marketplace effects test.”). For a
negative view of the importance of materiality, see Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the
Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 (2010).
25. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
26. See id. at 241–47.
27. Id. at 232–33.
24.
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word on materiality for Rule 10b-5 situations generally, importing the standard
from disputes in the section 14 proxy context.28
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,29 the predecessor to Basic, provided the
Court in Basic with case law on materiality in the proxy voting rights context that
helped flesh out Rule 10b-5.30
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one,
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of
materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be
or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a
reasonable investor’s judgment.31
TSC thus appears to treat significance as, at least in part, a definition, if not an
actual synonym, of materiality, and requires judgment of decisions as to the
certainty that information will impact reasonable investors’ decisions.32 That the
TSC Court addressed Section 14(a)33 and Rule 14a-934 does not distinguish the
weight of the discussion as it is the most heavily relied upon precedent in Basic.35
The Basic Court drew from TSC, “[a]s we clarify today, materiality depends on the
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information.”36

28. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (evaluating the materiality definition
specifically within the context of the proxy rules created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §14(a)); see also
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (considering whether the causal nature between a materially
false and misleading statement and the resultant merger gives rise to a cause of action based on the violation of
the proxy rules in § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
29. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
30. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); see also Thomas M. Madden, Causation in Private
Civil Actions by Minority Shareholders Under Proxy Provisions of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C.A. § 78n(a)) and Securities Exchange Act (SEC) Rules Thereunder—Post Virginia Bankshares, 137 A.L.R.
Fed. 293 (1997) (giving examples of how the “essential link” test—established by Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.— was used in other proxy cases to determine whether material misrepresentations and the ensuing actions
taken by minority shareholders gave rise to a cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
31. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
32. See generally Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the Reasonable
Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473 (2006) (arguing for a
new standard replacing the reasonable investor—to accommodate the underclass).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011).
35. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries
standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”).
36. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
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It is instructive to look carefully at the language from TSC because of its
continued reach. While the language focuses on materiality in the context of proxy
voting under Section 14, its rationale was directly adopted to the Section 10 and
Rule 10b-5 context and has remained there ever since.37 Yet, we can understand the
seminal materiality language better still if we consider the main resource for TSC—
the earlier Section 14 decision, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co..38
Mills set out clear policy motivation for the materiality standard it applied:
Doubts as to the critical nature of information misstated or omitted will be
commonplace. And particularly in view of the prophylactic purpose of the
Rule and the fact that the content of the proxy statement is within
management’s control, it is appropriate that these doubts be resolved in
favor of those the statute is designed to protect.39
In rejecting a lower court standard of materiality turning on what information a
reasonable investor “might consider important,” TSC further cautioned that:
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The potential liability for
a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of
materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its
management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or
misstatements, but also management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial
liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of
trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking.40
Justice Marshall explained,
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one,
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of
materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be

37.

See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
39. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448 (citing Mills, 396 U.S. at 385).
40. Id. at 448–49 (emphasis added); id. at 445 (rejecting Court of Appeals standard that material facts
include “facts which a reasonable investor might consider important”).
38.
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or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a
reasonable investor’s judgment.41
In perhaps the most influential passage in TSC, again referring heavily to Mills,
Marshall wrote,
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote. This standard is fully consistent with Mills’ general description of
materiality as a requirement that “the defect have a significant propensity
to affect the voting process.” It does not require proof of a substantial
likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the
reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate
is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
“total mix” of information made available.42
This language transitions to a much more consistent use of significant and forms of
significant in place of important—a usage that at least some courts have
subsequently closely adhered to—even if modified to the nuanced usage and the
facts of subsequent circuit court cases.43
The Basic court recognized the bright-line possibility and explicitly rejected it.44
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires
the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of
application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities
acts and Congress’ policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single
fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific

41.

Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
43. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The antifraud provisions’
materiality element is satisfied only if there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information
available.” (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449)); see also In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.–Taj Mahal
Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. . . . , defined
materiality within the proxy-solicitation context of § 14(a) of the 1934 Act. Subsequently the Court expressly
made the TSC standard applicable in actions under § 10 and Rule 105-b . . . , and we have made it applicable as
well in claims under §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act. . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
44. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
42.
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finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or
underinclusive.45
In addressing the split between the Second Circuit’s probability magnitude test and
the Sixth Circuit’s agreement in principle approach, the Supreme Court left us with
the circularity of its significance language.46
2. General Usage
In general usage outside of the legal context, “material” is defined, in part, as
“having significance or relevance;” “of serious or substantial import; significant,
important, of consequence.”47 In general usage within a legal context, “material” is
defined as “significant or influential.”48 “Significant” is similarly defined as
“sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy;
consequential, influential.”49 So it is reasonable to consider material and significant
to be synonyms in general usage.
3. Circuit Court Usage
In the circuit court decisions discussed, infra, as in the Supreme Court’s Matrixx,
courts continued to use Basic as the precedent for deriving a materiality definition
and substantiated it by either explicitly or implicitly citing TSC, and even Mills.50
Certain uses of significant by the circuit courts are nearly synonymous with
material’s general usage, but do not illuminate any clear standard of materiality.51
Some uses applied by the circuit courts in key decisions on Rule 10b-5 appear, on
their face, to be summarily tautological.52 Other uses are more nuanced, or pertain
more specifically to fact contexts of the 10b-5 cases.53 To fully comprehend the
meaning of significant qua material, we need to look more closely at these courts’
usage.

45.

Id.
Id. at 240.
47. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 54–116 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Hill v. Gozani, 683 F.3d 40, 57 (1st Cir. 2011); Miss. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific
Corp., 649 F.3d 5, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2011); Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2001).
52. See, e.g., In re Aetna Sec. Litig., 617 F.3d 272, 283–85 (3d Cir. 2010); Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801,
809 (6th Cir. 2008).
53. See, e.g., Hill, 638 F.3d at 57; Miss. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 649 F.3d at 20–21; Castellano, 257 F.3d at 181–
82.
46.
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In Hill v. Gozani54 the First Circuit anticipated Matrixx by emphasizing that
material information need not be disclosed in all circumstances—even where
certain facts “demonstrate a significant probability that the noted risks would
materialize and that the effect of those risks on the company’s future would be
significant.”55 In Hill, where certain information about the use of fraudulent
neurology codes and the Medicare 10% rule was not enough to indicate “near
certainty of ruin” and even where the company had made prior public mention of a
risk of non-reimbursement by third party payers, the First Circuit found no duty to
disclose or further expound such information.56 The court looked to the TSC
materiality standard.57 While the court referred to the information at issue as “not
insignificant” and “material,” the court’s decision turned on the lack of certainty
that the information not disclosed in a press release would translate into “failure or
. . . comprehensive cover-up.”58 This usage of significant may apply a higher
threshold finding of materiality than indicated in the Matrixx decision.59 The First
Circuit’s use of significant is directed at describing the degree of the impact of
certain information, not necessarily the importance of certain information to
investors.60 Moreover, the court’s interpretation of an actionable standard of
materiality appears to require absolute certainty of significance, rather than a lesser
likelihood—harkening back to the language in TSC.
The use of material has also been addressed in the context of the close link
between scienter and materiality among the elements of securities fraud. In
Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Boston Scientific Corp.,61 the First
Circuit applied Matrixx’s holding, reiterating the Basic standard in rejecting a bright
line standard that would, in essence, translate statistical significance into
materiality.62 While the First Circuit did not equate materiality with scienter, it
pointed to the close relationship with materiality, noting, “knowingly omitting
material information is probative, although not determinative, of materiality.”63
Exploring the alleged material misstatements and omissions that might have
inferred scienter, the court did not find that the defendant had “recklessly created a
significant risk” that would have required the defendant company to issue a recall
54.

638 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 59.
57. Id. at 57.
58. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
59. See Hill v. Gozani, 651 F.3d 151, 152–53 (1st Cir. 2011) (denying rehearing en banc in light of the
Matrixx decision and reiterating the prior holding).
60. See Hill, 638 F.3d at 59.
61. 649 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011).
62. Id. at 20–21.
63. Id. at 20 (quoting Miss. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp. (BSC I), 523 F.3d 75, 87 (1st
Cir. 2008)).
55.
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of its affected products.64 The First Circuit apparently saw in Matrixx broad
discretion in finding materiality other than as statistical significance, and employed
a usage of significance rather more generally characterized as an amount.
The Second Circuit’s earlier adherence to the bright line statistical significance
standard on materiality in Carter-Wallace, was clearly repudiated in Matrixx.65 In
Carter-Wallace I,66 the Second Circuit found that the issuer’s failure to disclose
deaths relating to the drug it manufactured was not a Rule 10b-5 violation as the
information “did not become materially misleading until Carter-Wallace had
information that [the drug] had caused a statistically significant number of . . .
deaths.”67 The Second Circuit reiterated this conclusion in a subsequent CarterWallace decision.68
In Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.,69 the Second Circuit applied the Basic
and TSC materiality test focusing on ‘probability—magnitude.’70 Here, the Second
Circuit considered the materiality of merger discussions based upon the probability
that the merger would occur; “[u]nder the materiality test set out in Basic, the
potential significance of a merger is considered in light of the likelihood that it will
occur.”71 This usage of significance is akin to probability.
In In re Aetna Securities Litigation,72 the Third Circuit applied the materiality
standard from Basic and TSC (“significantly altering the total mix”) and, yet gave
no further shrift to significance in its application after citing the standard.73 The
court’s analysis in determining the materiality of alleged forward looking statements
about “disciplined pricing” was centered on the vagueness of the pricing claim in
not finding materiality.74 The court’s usage of significant was simply to recite and
apply the standard.75
In SEC v. Snyder,76 an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit found that a “jury
was entitled to find that the prediction of significant shortfalls in the second quarter
was information that a reasonable investor would have found important.”77 This
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
1968)).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1319–21 (2011).
150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
In re Carter-Wallace, Inc., Sec. Litig., 220 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
257 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 185 (relying on Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
617 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 283–85.
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 283–85.
292 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 404.
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usage of significant involved in the court’s application of the materiality standard
once again appears to indicate degree, or amount.78 It also shows a linkage between
significant and important found in the language of Basic and TSC.
In Ley v. Visteon Corp.,79 the Sixth Circuit applied the Basic and TSC derived
materiality standard to an allegation that a spin-off of Ford failed to disclose
material information about its derivation from Ford and its dependent contractual
relations with Ford.80 Applying the standard, the court opined: “[g]iven that the
disclosures Plaintiffs propose are merely interpretations drawn from the facts
presented in the prospectuses [of the spin-off], and do not actually provide new
information, they would not have ‘significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of the
information already presented in the prospectuses.’”81 This usage simply cited the
standard and summarily made a conclusion in accordance with it.82 Such usage
appears to be definitional or even synonymous.83
In the unpublished case Saxe v. Dlusky,84 the Sixth Circuit applied the same
materiality analysis in facts involving a privately negotiated transaction.85 The court
found, “[b]ased on the professional licenses required to offer professional
services . . . , [the defendant] did not make a material misrepresentation to [the
plaintiff in stating his opinion] about the significance of her lack of professional
licenses.”86 The court looked to Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,87 applied Basic, and discussed
the narrow instances where opinion can be actionable under materiality standards
of 10(b)—where stated opinion is not believed by its speaker and is “not factually
well-grounded.”88 Here, the application of significance looks to be a direct
implementation of the TSC derived materiality standard and significant looks to be
interchangeable with material.
The Sixth Circuit’s City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone
Corp.89 includes ample application of the Basic/TSC standard on materiality
principally via Helwig and applies it to facts surrounding a declaration of no
impairment of Bridgestone assets in an annual report.90 Here, the Sixth Circuit
interchanged its use of significant with important: “[w]e conclude—at a
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
543 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 808–09.
Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
Id. at 808–09.
See id.
268 F. App’x 438 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001).
Saxe, 268 F. App’x at 441.
399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 679.
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minimum—that the probability or reasonable possibility of Firestone’s brand name
experiencing a significant asset impairment was not information ‘so obviously
unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the
question of [its] unimportance.’”91
The Eighth Circuit addressed the materiality issue in NECA-IBEW Pension Fund
v. Hutchinson Technology, Inc.,92 finding that vague statements could not be relied
upon by reasonable investors:
[S]ome statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no
reasonable investor would rely upon them. The role of the materiality
requirement is not to attribute to investors a childlike simplicity but rather
to determine whether a reasonable investor would have considered the
omitted information significant at the time . . . soft, puffing statements
generally lack materiality because the market price of a share is not inflated
by vague statements predicting growth. No reasonable investor would rely
on these statements, and they are certainly not specific enough to perpetrate
a fraud on the market.93
Here, the usage of some form of significant and material appear virtually
interchangeable or synonymous.
In United States v. Reyes,94 the Ninth Circuit, though in a criminal case and not a
private action, applied the materiality standard from Basic and TSC to facts
regarding the misstatement of earnings.95 The court wrote:
Taking into account the cumulative testimony of the witnesses regarding the
materiality of the Company’s misstatement of its earnings, coupled with the
information in the Company’s financial statements and SEC filings, and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a
rational jury could find that Brocade’s significantly overstated net income
and underreported losses were material to investors.96
This usage describes the degree of inaccuracy of certain information in a manner
difficult to distinguish from the synonymous use of material itself.

91.

Id. at 679–80 (emphasis added) (citing Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir. 2001)).
536 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2008).
93. Id. at 960–61(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122
F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997)).
94. 660 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2011).
95. Id. at 469. I discuss cases other than private actions where court usage of significant in determining
materiality is directly on point with the same issue in private actions.
96. Id. at 470 (emphasis added) (citing Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., 527 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008)).
92.
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In SEC v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Investment Fund,97 the Ninth Circuit
applied Basic and TSC, referencing the need to find that an “omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder.”98
The court stated that, “misstatements and omissions created the false impression
that Global Capital was profitable, an impression that would have assumed
significance in the deliberations of any reasonable investor.”99 Here, the usage is a
direct application of the materiality standard derived though Basic from TSC; yet,
the linkage between significance and material is apparently a fact based conclusion;
the addition of “actual” indicating factual verification or conclusion.100
In Rockies Fund, Inc.,101 the D.C. Circuit applied the Basic/TSC materiality
language, and employed significant in looking at the misclassification of funds and
allegedly improper valuation.102 The court almost summarily opined that the
overvaluation of a fund’s largest asset “would have been significant information for
potential Fund investors.”103 This usage appears to be conclusory on facts and
synonymous with materiality.
The circuit courts, thus, have used forms of significance in determining
materiality both before and after Matrixx in a range of ways or meanings. We are
faced, in some instances, with a near tautological use of significance as a definition
of material;104 as a synonym of material;105 as “actual significance” (apparently
meeting an at least implied fact-based standard);106 as importance (definitional and
also at least nearly synonymous);107 as degree or amount and even near certainty or
probability;108 and, finally, as the recently rejected standard of meeting a statistical
threshold, “statistical significance,”109 all stemming from the TSC language derived
through Basic.

97.

289 F. App’x 183 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 186 (emphasis added) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
99. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
100. See id. at 186.
101. Rockies Fund, Inc. v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 428 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
102. Id. at 1096–97.
103. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added). Similar direct/quoted usage is found in Benzon v. Morgan Stanley
Distribs., 420 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005).
104. See, e.g., Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 809 (6th Cir. 2011).
105. See, e.g., NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., 536 F.3d 952, 960–61 (8th Cir. 2008).
106. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Inv. Fund, 289 F. App’x 183, 186 (9th
Cir. 2008).
107. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Snyder, 292 F. App’x 391, 404 (5th Cir. 2008).
108. See, e.g., Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 2001).
109. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2011).
98.
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4. Other Recent U.S. Supreme Court Usage
Albeit in a distinguishable context, the Supreme Court recently looked at the
interplay of significant and material in considering the application of the Exchange
Act to a foreign listed foreign corporation.110 In Robert Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.,111 the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a Section 10(b)
based complaint regarding shares of a foreign corporation traded on a foreign
exchange, finding that the Exchange Act did not apply to extraterritorial
transactions.112 In its discussion, the Court considered applying a test of whether
“‘acts of material importance’ performed in the United States ‘significantly
contributed’ to [the] result [of losses to US investors abroad].”113 The Court also
considered the “significant and material conduct” test providing that violation of
10(b) be found “when the fraud involved significant conduct in the United States
that is material to the fraud’s success.”114 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia not
only found no textual support for the latter test and no reason to apply the prior
test, but also that the focus of the deception at the heart of the fraud (in the instant
case, Florida) did not determine the application of the Exchange Act.115 Yet, the
Court’s very consideration of these tests again supports the near synonymous usage
of significant and material in the consideration of Section 10(b) violations.116
B. Matrixx Reduxx
In Matrixx, of course, the Supreme Court spoke further on significance.117 The
decision was anticipated as an opportunity to adopt a bright line standard and to

110.

Robert Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2886 (2010).
Id. at 2869.
112. Id. at 2883.
113. Id. at 2879 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 2886 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 2884.
116. See Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 343, 386 (2011) (“The correct standard for the transnational application of § 10(b) is the one proposed by
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan in the Government’s amicus brief to the Supreme Court. Under that
standard, a transnational securities fraud violates § 10(b) when the fraud involves significant conduct in the US
that is material to the fraud’s success and that fraud directly caused the plaintiff’s injury. This standard strikes
the proper balance between advancing § 10(b)’s remedial objectives and conserving the scarce resources of US
courts and law enforcement authorities for regulation of securities fraud that has a substantial connection to the
US. The Solicitor General’s standard is also consistent with the presumption against extraterritoriality and the
Charming Betsy rule, and fits in neatly with the larger mosaic of recent Supreme Court securities fraud
jurisprudence. . . .” (citations omitted)).
117. See Siobhan Innes-Gawn, The Significance of it All: Corporate Disclosure in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 174 (2011).
111.
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greatly impact the active and charged realm of pharmaceutical class actions.118 No
great guidance came forth. No enhanced parsing out of the materiality element
generally resulted. Justice Sotomayor clarified for us that significance, at least in a
context concerning the alleged loss of smell, or anosmia, resulting from use of
certain cold medicine, Zicam (containing zinc), may in fact be found where
information has “plausibly indicated a reliable causal link” and need not meet a
standard of “statistical significance.”119 Yet, we are left in essence with broad circuit
variation on precise definition of materiality.120 This intellectually and practically
dissatisfying jurisprudence leaves us still with a virtual tautology—materiality as
significance.
Matrixx presented a pharmaceutical industry fact scenario where a decision
regarding the materiality of data about a pharmaceutical product was called into
question in a class action brought under Rule 10b-5.121 The issue required a decision
on whether to find a “bright line” rule that statistical significance equated with
materiality. The Court rejected the bright line rule under Basic’s total mix [standard
of significance determining materiality], repudiating Carter-Wallace and reasoning,
“[g]iven that medical professionals and regulators act on the basis of evidence of
causation that is not statistically significant, it stands to reason that in certain cases
reasonable investors would as well.”122 The Court went on:
[T]he mere existence of reports of adverse events—which says nothing in
and of itself about whether the drug is causing the adverse events—will not
satisfy this standard. Something more is needed, but that something more is
not limited to statistical significance and can come from “the source,
content, and reports[.]”123

118. William Sullivan et al., Supreme Court Will Examine Materiality in Securities Fraud Class Action Against
Pharmaceutical Company, in PAUL HASTINGS, STAYCURRENT (July 2010), www.paulhastings.com/assets/publicati
ons/1647.pdf.
119. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011). “A study that is statistically
significant has results that are unlikely to be the result of random error. . . .” Id. at 1319 n.6 (emphasis added)
(quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 354 (2d ed. 2000)).
120. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing circuit court usage).
121. See George A. Mocsary, Statistically Insignificant Deaths: Disclosing Drug Harms to Investors (and
Patients) Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting
Ducks of Securities Class Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data,
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 932 (2010) (“The clear clash between the ostensibly objective, numerically based
standard of the bio-pharma industry and the amorphous standard of the securities laws presents an enormous
liability risk to the bio-pharmas.”).
122. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
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So materiality does not equate with a level of statistical significance (or need not be
pleaded to equate with such a level).124 Materiality may be something other than (or
be pleaded to be more than) one or more reports of adverse events known to an
issuer in order for that issuer to be held liable in failing to disclose material
information under Rule 10b-5.
Yet, in rejecting a bright line statistical significance standard of materiality, the
Court went on to use “significant” more generally in considering the pleading:
Viewing the allegations of the complaint as a whole, the complaint alleges
facts suggesting a significant risk to the commercial viability of a leading
product. . . . Assuming the complaint’s allegations to be true, . . . Matrixx
had information indicating a significant risk to its leading revenuegenerating product.125
The Court continued to employ “significant” in Matrixx, other than as statistical
significance, more broadly still, even in directly quoting the language from Basic.126
“As in Basic, Matrixx’s categorical rule would ‘artificially exclud[e]’ information
that ‘would otherwise be considered significant to the trading decision of a
reasonable investor.’”127 This usage goes to the more general “total mix” analysis
from Basic and TSC outside of the specifics of adverse events known about the drug
at issue and more generally concerning the impact on those who might be trading
on the issuer’s securities in the market.128 It appears to call for a fact based
conclusion directly tied to the Basic/TSC language. It is the essence of the same
tautological problem found in circuit court usage.129
Matrixx, while rejecting the statistical significance bright line standard on
materiality, has simply re-presented synonymous usage of significance practically
constituting a tautology of significance qua materiality.130 This usage looks back to
the often recited language of Basic derived from TSC and Mills that we have seen
repeated in several circuit court opinions, supra.131 It may be the reflection of the

124.

Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 1319, 1323.
127. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318 (emphasis added) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)).
128. Id. at 1312.
129. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing circuit court usage).
130. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1313.
131. See, e.g., Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and
citations omitted) (“[S]ome statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor
would rely upon them. The role of the materiality requirement is not to attribute to investors a
childlike simplicity but rather to determine whether a reasonable investor would have considered the omitted
information significant at the time. . . . [S]oft, puffing statements generally lack materiality because the market
price of a share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth. No reasonable investor would rely on
125.
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inevitable fact determinative nature of materiality, explicitly recognized in Basic.
Yet, more so, it appears to reflect the inadequacy of language or language usage by
the courts to capture a more measurable definition of materiality.132
Circuit court usage of significance ranges from this tautological usage to more
nuanced uses—meaning degree or amount, probability, and even near certainty.133
The circuit courts’ various use of significance in defining materiality all have clear
roots in Basic, if not TSC and Mills—witness “actual,” “important,” “substantial
likelihood” can all be found in these Supreme Court precedents.134 Yet, none
appears to give us an understanding of “significant” that truly sets it apart from a
tautological trade off with the element of materiality itself—an element that is
notoriously amorphous.135 Matrixx has done little or nothing to change or clarify
this.

these statements, and they are certainly not specific enough to perpetrate a fraud on the market.”); Saxe v.
Dlusky, 268 F. App’x 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Based on the professional licenses required to offer professional
services through PDS Planning and the compensation scheme employed by PDS Planning, Dlusky did not make
a material misrepresentation to Saxe about the significance of her lack of professional licenses.”).
132. Compare United States v. Reyes, 660 F.3d 454, 470 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Taking into account the
cumulative testimony of the witnesses regarding the materiality of the Company’s misstatement of its earnings,
coupled with the information in the Company’s financial statements and SEC filings, and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational jury could find that Brocade’s significantly overstated
net income and underreported losses were material to investors.”) with SEC v. Snyder, 292 F. App’x 391, 404
(5th Cir. 2008) (“We held in Fox that the fact that insiders had access to certain forecasts ‘would have supported
a finding of materiality.’ In the present case, the jury was entitled to find that the predictions of significant
shortfalls in the second quarter was information that a reasonable investor would have found important.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
133. See supra Part II.A.3.
134. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“The general standard of
materiality that we think best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote. This standard is fully consistent with Mills’ general description of materiality as a requirement that ‘the
defect have a significant Propensity to affect the voting process.’ It does not require proof of a substantial
likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”).
135. See Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., 420 F.3d 598, 609 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Given that the disclosures
Plaintiffs propose are merely interpretations drawn from the facts presented in the prospectuses, and do not
actually provide new information, they would not have significantly altered the total mix of the information
already presented in the prospectuses.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Rockies Fund, Inc.
v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 428 F.3d 1088, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting briefly that the misclassification of funds
and allegedly improper valuation “would have been significant information for potential Fund investors”).
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C. Hindsight—The Ex Post Perspective on the Ex Ante Determination
Part of the challenge of clarifying the usage of significant qua materiality is bound
up with the ex post/ex ante problem. Judgment by a court occurs after some event
has led to litigation.136 In an action under Rule 10b-5, that judgment focuses, at least
in part, on the quality of a decision made to disclose or not disclose certain
information at a prior time.137 In making 10b-5 determinations, courts must look
back, if you will, to judge that decision often quite some time after it was made—
with changed knowledge making the decision look quite different.138 This looking
back is what I am referring to as the ex post perspective on an ex ante
determination. It is closely allied with a general problem of hindsight, a subset of
which has been explored as the fraud by hindsight doctrine.139
For an example of a court’s recognition of the hindsight issue in the securities
fraud context, consider the Southern District of New York’s In re Sanofi-Aventis
Securities Litigation.140 The Southern District commented that “[t]he omission of
facts that may be material or significant by hindsight does not render their omission
at a prior time misleading. This Court must engage in a statement-by-statement
analysis to make such a determination at the pleading stage.”141
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Donald Langevoort have traced the
development of the fraud by hindsight doctrine since Judge Friendly’s 1978 Denny
136. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding
that an editor violated Rule 10b-5 after a promotional email that purported to have information obtained from
“a senior company executive” claiming to possess a “super insider tip” falsely stated date of sale); see also
Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, 512 F.3d 634, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming a finding that an underwriter
for municipal bonds and its chairman violated Rule 10b-5 as a result of failing to disclose that the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation planned to leave the office building when issuing bonds for potential investors).
137. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 788
(2004) (“A material event is one that a reasonable investor would consider important. Here, given the
occurrence of some bad event, the judge has to assess whether a prior warning sign should have been recognized
(and disclosed). The hindsight problem arises because, once the bad event has occurred, the judge will be biased
toward finding that the warning should have been disclosed. Courts refer to the information regarding such
warnings as contingent.”).
138. Id. at 774 (“Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and mistake. People consistently overstate
what could have been predicted after events have unfolded–a phenomenon psychologists call the hindsight
bias. People believe they could have predicted events better than was actually the case and believe that others
should have been able to predict them. Consequently, they blame others for failing to have foreseen events that
reasonable people in foresight could not have foreseen. In the context of securities regulation, hindsight can
mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad outcome was not only predictable, but was actually predicted by
managers.” (citations omitted)).
139. Id. at 778 (“In cases alleging securities fraud, courts must determine what corporate managers knew
and when they knew it. Such judgments might be clouded by the present knowledge of how events ultimately
unfolded. In many contexts, courts have developed adaptations to the problem of judging in hindsight. The
FBH doctrine might be one such adaptation.” (citations omitted)).
140. 774 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
141. Id. at 565 n.15.
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v. Barber142 opinion and discussed it together with hindsight bias.143 They have
questioned the role of the fraud by hindsight doctrine as an influence on judges
debiasing the effect of hindsight, with some particular attention to assessing
materiality and scienter in securities fraud actions.144 Though their data suggests that
the doctrine is most often applied to analysis of the scienter element in securities
fraud actions, Gulati, Rachlinski and Langevoort also found ample discussion of the
doctrine with regard to the element of materiality.145 Ultimately, in their “quasiempirical” study, they found that the doctrine, in practice, is employed as
justification for an effort to manage the procedure of securities law cases.146 That is,
the doctrine—prohibiting a finding of fraud by hindsight—is applied by judges as a
means to exert procedural control over a given case at the early stages of litigation.147
Relying on Gulati and company’s assessment, then, it appears that the doctrine is
more of a justification for controlling case process leading to outcome, rather than a
developed rule applied to substantive facts.148 Indeed, this scholarship concludes

142.

Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1978).
See Rachlinski, supra note 137, at 796 (“The doctrine originates in 1978 with Judge Friendly’s opinion
in Denny v. Barber. As with many of the early cases applying the FBH doctrine, Denny involved a bank and
loans that turned out badly. As part of a securities fraud claim against the bank, plaintiffs alleged that the bank
had engaged in unsound lending practices, maintained insufficient loan loss reserves, delayed writing off bad
loans, and undertaken speculative investments. . . . Judge Friendly ruled that merely identifying the disclosure in
late 1974 was inadequate to show that the defendants had the requisite state of mind in 1973 and early 1974.”
(citations omitted)).
144. Id. at 788 (citations omitted) (“The hindsight bias implicates two distinct elements in securities fraud
claims: scienter and materiality. Scienter refers to the state of mind the defendant must possess for there to be a
valid fraud claim under the federal securities laws. . . . A material event is one that a reasonable investor would
consider important. Here, given the occurrence of some bad event, the judge has to assess whether a prior
warning sign should have been recognized (and disclosed).”).
145. Id. at 790–91 (“This distinction between scienter and materiality thus creates a testable prediction. If
the FBH doctrine is an attempt to rid securities litigation of the hindsight bias, it should play a more important
role in assessments of contingent materiality cases than assessments of scienter. In contrast, if case management
is the true goal of FBH, judges would prefer to attack claims of scienter. If a court finds that no reasonable
inference of scienter can be made against an individual, the case against that individual ends because the person
lacked the intent to commit fraud.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 785 (“To restate, the case management hypothesis supposes that judges have developed the FBH
doctrine as an attempt to gain control over securities fraud cases. The reference to the biasing effects of
hindsight might thus provide only the ostensible justification for departing from the open notice pleading
system laid down in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather than as a careful effort to control bias, judges
are using the real influence of the hindsight bias as a pretext for judging cases on the merits early in the
litigation process.”).
148. See id. at 782 (“Despite appearances, it might be unrealistic to suppose that judges have developed this
clever adaptation to resolve a psychological phenomenon. Instead, the references to hindsight might be little
more than a pretext for legitimizing greater judicial control over securities fraud cases filed in federal court. The
FBH doctrine might not really be a well-developed adaptation, but might serve merely as a judging ‘heuristic’ or
143.
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that the doctrine has been without any substantive development in the case law.149
Jeffrey Rachlinski has previously considered in some further depth the nature of
hindsight in assessing decision-making among judges.150 Rachlinski’s scholarship
convincingly asserts that,
[i]n hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been
anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as
having been inevitable, but also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively
inevitable’ before it happened. People believe that others should have been
able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.151
How does this prevalence of hindsight bias among our judges impact the
possibility of making fair assessments of decisions on disclosure under Rule 10b5—i.e. judicial decisions—which must have been made ex ante and not biased by ex
post knowledge?
After specifically looking at courts’ treatment of federal securities law issued and
“fraud by hindsight,” Rachlinski notes that “[t]he federal courts have adopted a
particularly vigorous prohibition against liability based solely on hindsight in cases
alleging violations of federal securities laws.”152 In reviewing securities fraud cases,
he focuses on the heightened pleading standards under the PSLRA. He concludes,
more generally, that courts do not utilize any generic debiasing strategy, but may
have particular mechanisms for reducing or accommodating the bias.153 The PSLRA
legislation was an attempt to address the awareness of the difficulty of judging
securities fraud and to mitigate against the ease of bringing frivolous suits.154

‘shortcut’ that allows judges to sort what they perceive to be plausible and frivolous cases early in the litigation
process.”).
149. Id. at 813.
150. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571,
572 (1998) (citing two prior studies, Rachlinski argues that hindsight bias is prevalent in the United States
judicial system).
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 616. For more on this, Rachlinski cites Brian D. Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the “Strike
Suit”: Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK L. REV. 593, 605–06 (1995) and Robert A. Prentice & John H.
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (1994).
153. Rachlinski, supra note 150, at 616 (“The federal courts have adopted a particularly vigorous prohibition
against liability based solely on hindsight in cases alleging violations of the federal securities laws. To win a
federal securities case, a plaintiff must allege and prove that a defendant has intentionally misrepresented
material facts about a publicly traded company in an effort to defraud investors. As in all fraud cases, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must make additional allegations of specific
instances of intended fraud.”).
154. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913,
914 (2003) (“In 1995 Congress set out to fix securities class action litigation when it passed the Private Securities
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Notwithstanding Rachlinski’s recognition of the attempted mitigation, the body
of his work leaves us unconvinced that federal courts judging decisions on
disclosure in private rights of action under Rule 10b-5 are assessing, or can assess,
those decisions on disclosure truly as made ex-ante. Rather, his data, together with
others’ related work, seems to suggest that some disturbing percentage of judicial
decisions on fraud (and other issues) turn, in large part, on hindsight bias—the ex
post reality that makes the ex ante decision at issue seem much clearer upon ex post
judicial assessment.155
On this ex post/ex ante notion, the element of materiality is at a nexus with the
elements of reliance and causation with the fraud-on-the-market theory.156 While
this much discussed and increasingly discredited theory157 is currently before the
Court again in Halliburton, we are presently concerned with it only as it ties to our
more general discussion of materiality.158
In a fraud-on-the-market case, materiality is the other side of the same coin
as reliance. Information that is not material does not affect the stock price
or expected returns and so would not cause a reasonable investor to buy or
sell a security. In other words, plaintiffs who cannot prove materiality
cannot prove transaction causation. Under a fraud-on-the-market theory,
transaction causation and reliance are collapsed; in an efficient market it is

Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA, the Act, or the Reform Act). The Reform Act was designed to address a
number of perceived abuses in these cases. In large part, its solution was to create a series of procedural hurdles
that make it more difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring and maintain nonmeritorious securities fraud class
actions.”).
155. Rachlinski, supra note 150, at 588. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 644–46 (1996) (discussing the implications of the hindsight bias to the
assessment of scienter in securities fraud cases); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges
Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does – Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 127–28 (2002).
156. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 455, 507 (2006).
157. See James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 1719, 1728–31 (2013) (“Because there are no reliable models for determining the ‘correct’ price of a
security, it is not possible to determine whether all information, or even some information, is fully and rapidly
impounded into a security’s price. . . . Today, there is less clarity regarding the prescriptive qualities of the
efficient market hypothesis. It remains a hypothesis, but one that is greatly qualified.”). In his discussion, Cox
cites Victor L. Bernard, Christine Botosan & Gregory D. Phillips, Challenges to Efficient Market Hypothesis:
Limits to the Applicability of Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 73 NEB. L. REV. 781, 782–84 (1994) and Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 584–89 (1984).
158. Booth discusses materiality both in terms of a reasonable investor and having a price impact vital in
applying the fraud-on-the-market theory. Booth, supra note 1, at 520–21. He also notes that many circuit
courts conflate the two meanings. Id. at 553.
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presumed that an investor would not knowingly buy a security at a price
higher than its true value.159
The elements of reliance, causation and materiality, then, are inextricably linked,
particularly when applying the fraud-on-the-market theory.
The fraud-on-the-market doctrine helped make material information mean
essentially the same thing as information that was likely to change the
market price. In terms of giving management guidance on what to say, this
meant that management could omit details that would not affect the price
of its stock. One problem with this rule is that there is an expected, or ex
ante effect versus an ex post effect. Management may legitimately believe
that information it did not report would have no effect on their employer’s
stock price only to be surprised by a price decline upon its disclosure.160
Assuming efficient markets under the efficient capital markets hypothesis
(“ECMH”), once the market price has moved subsequent to disclosure, are we still
able to judge the materiality or the related significance of information factored into
the disclosure decision fairly, as though we do not have any altering subsequent
knowledge as to how the market or stock price actually did or did not move? The
hindsight problem is a real one in defining materiality in a meaningful way that sets
a measurable standard.161 Materiality as significance is not enough. The reach of this
tautological problem is so broad that it enters into the reliance and causation
elements and further erodes the ECMH.162
In Basic, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he idea of a free and open public
market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as
to the fair price of a security brings [sic] about a situation where the open market
price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.”163 This belief in the market achieving
159.

Dunbar, supra note 156, at 507.
Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
161. Rachlinski, supra note 137, at 816 (“In cases in which contingent materiality is an issue (essentially all
cases in which materiality is an issue in dispute), the contemporaneous evidence that courts assert they must
assess is precisely the evidence that the hindsight bias will influence. The unripe information that plaintiffs
allege to be material is always contemporary and hence always fair game for the courts to consider.”).
162. Dunbar, supra note 156, at 469 (“Because material information is defined as information that would
affect the transaction decision, if that information is impounded in a stock price, then the stock price itself
provides the evidence as to whether the information would generally affect transaction decisions. As has been
noted by various courts, under the efficient market theory, materiality and transaction causation often blend
together: if a stock price is statistically different from where it would be in the absence of fraud, then the
relevant information was both material to the price and can be presumed to have caused the transactions at that
price.”).
163. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). The Basic Court cited studies referenced in In re LTV
Secs. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities
160.
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a “just price” is the assumption of the ECMH built into the fraud-on-the-markettheory.164
Indeed, the Basic Court explained,
[w]e need not determine by adjudication what economists and social
scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis
and the application of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the
presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.165
We should keep in mind, however, that the presumption of reliance can be rebutted
by a rather low threshold showing that “severs the link” between a disclosed
misrepresentation and resultant price or decision to trade.166
Since Basic, federal courts have conflated the Rule 10b-5 reliance element with
causation as assumed in the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory and the
ECMH, such that if market prices move in reaction to disclosure, reliance may be
assumed.167 Here, of course, our concern is not with the element of reliance, but
with materiality, and our discussion of the fraud-on-the-market theory is
conducted with only materiality in mind.

Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 n.9 (1982) (citing literature on efficientcapital-market theory); and Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374 n.1, 375–81 (1984).
164. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 153
(2009) (“[The] fact-specific, ex post emphasis on assessing importance to the reasonable investor has been
followed faithfully by the lower courts [since Basic], though critics still carp at its indeterminacy.” (citations
omitted)); see also Dennis, supra note 163, at 419 (“The legal test of materiality is consistent with this Article’s
suggested approach. Both TSC Industries and the efficient market model recognize that investors react to a total
mix of information. The model quantifies the total mix concept. The price signaling mechanism represents the
transmittal of a complete information set of publicly available data.”); Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the
Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 323–24 (2007) (noting
that stock prices will change when investors receive material information).
165. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.24.
166. Id. at 248 (“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price
received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the
presumption of reliance. For example, if petitioners could show that the ‘market makers’ were privy to the truth
about the merger discussions here with Combustion, and thus that the market price would not have been
affected by their misrepresentations, the causal connection could be broken: the basis for finding that the fraud
had been transmitted through market price would be gone.”).
167. Dunbar, supra note 156, at 458 (“The fraud-on-the-market theory left these requirements intact, but
allowed for a presumption of reliance if the security traded in an efficient market. The reasoning behind this . . .
was that all investors rely on the market price when making a purchase decision, so that if the market price
reflected the effects of an omission or misstatement, then every investor could be presumed to have relied on
information that incorporated that omission or misstatement.”).
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One manner in which to attempt a fair assessment of materiality ex post is to
look at market reaction to disclosed information through an “event study.”168
Findings of abnormal returns in event studies are checked against statistical
significance to determine the impact of chance or patterns on market pricing versus
the disclosed information.169 Macey and company argue that market reaction should
be measured regardless of market efficiency or inefficiency, though Basic limits the
reliance presumption in the fraud-on-the-market theory to the context of efficient
markets —adopting the ECMH.170
Deciding whether or what to disclose post-Basic, assuming efficient markets,
requires an ex ante decision as to what will move those efficient markets. It is akin
to assessing whether the information at issue is likely to have a measurable effect on
the market.171 Though it is bound up with the reliance and causation elements
involved in the fraud-on-the-market theory, we can view this, again, as a decision
about materiality. How can we fairly judge that an ex ante decision as to what will
move the markets after the disclosure or nondisclosure, after a stock price has or
has not moved?
In In re Merck & Co. Securities Litigation,172 the Third Circuit wrestled with the
application of the efficient market hypothesis in considering the plaintiff’s
allegation that change in market price “dropped significantly” in reaction to press
attention to accounting practices relating to the wholly owned subsidiary Merck
was spinning off in an IPO, and found that Merck’s disclosures or lack of disclosure
did not leave “every analyst in the dark.”173 While the court delved into the
materiality definition under its Section 11 discussion, its analysis is germane to
Section 10(b): “in efficient markets materiality is defined as ‘information that alters

168. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the
Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1029 (1991) (“The idea behind event studies is simple. To test
whether and how much a stock price has reacted to news, the researcher examines to what extent the return on
the stock in the period when the market receives the news (the actual return) differs from what the return
would have been without the news (the predicted return).”).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1027 (“Capital markets are almost surely inefficient. The market-efficiency hypothesis, that
security prices fully reflect all available information, is an extreme null hypothesis, a point on a continuum, and
so almost surely false. The interesting task is not to accept or reject market efficiency but to measure the extent
to which the behavior of returns departs from its predictions. We can then make informed judgments about the
scenarios where market efficiency is a good approximation and those where some other model is a better
simplifying view of the world.” (citations omitted)).
171. Rachlinski, supra note 150, at 572 (“The [hindsight] bias can cause judges and juries to find liable even
those defendants who attempted to avoid negligence by undertaking all reasonable precautions in foresight. Not
only does this seem unjust, but it also might have adverse economic consequences. Any potential defendant
who is aware of the implications of the hindsight bias might try to avoid liability by taking an excess of
precautions. The hindsight bias thus suggests a problem with the law and economics of negligence.”).
172. 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
173. Id. at 268–71.
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the price of the firm’s stock.’”174 The court reached this conclusion in two steps.
First, the court noted that “reasonable investors” are the market.175 Second,
information that is important to the market will be reflected in the stock’s price.176
Thus, “information important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately
incorporated into stock prices.”177 The court further noted that the change in stock
price could be looked at “post hoc.”178 The use of significant, here, assesses the move
in the market. It really refers to an amount.
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of the fraud-on-the-market theory is that it
assumes efficient markets.179 Many have taken issue with this assumption—at least
with the form of it adopted in Basic180—with some more recent substantive criticism
of it coming from behavioral economists.181
[T]he real question is whether the theories developed in behavioral finance
present specific reasons why material news and significant stock price
movements should not be considered as mirror images of one another. [I]n
an efficient market, one can measure the value that some information has
to the average market participant by measuring the change in stock price
caused when that information is revealed to the market. Because the stock
price is the present value of future cash flows in an efficient market, changes

174.

Id. at 274.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (“If a company’s stock trades on an efficient market, we measure materiality under the
Burlington (as ratified in Oran) standard. Thus, ‘the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post
hoc by looking to the movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s
stock.’”).
179. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 168, at 1027 (“The market-efficiency hypothesis, that security prices fully
reflect all available information, is an extreme null hypothesis, a point on a continuum, and so almost surely
false.”).
180. See id. at 1018 (“We suggest that the focus of the Supreme Court’s holding in Basic is misplaced: what
determines whether investors were justified in relying on the integrity of the market price is not the efficiency of
the relevant market but rather whether a misstatement distorted the price of the affected security.”).
181. See, e.g., Dunbar, supra note 156, at 507; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor
Governance, 59 WASH & LEE L. REV. 767, 769 (2002) (“Recently, a subdiscipline of behavioral economics has
blossomed, enervating the thirty-year-old tenets of the efficient market story. Called behavioral finance, this
discipline rests on two foundations. The first holds that a substantial amount of stock pricing is performed by
investors who do not accurately perceive underlying business values and hence produce prices that do not
reflect those values. Investor sentiment, rather than rational economic calculation, contributes significantly to
price formation.”); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud
Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 170 (2000) (drawing on Max Bazerman’s concept of selective perception);
Robert Prentice, Wither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding its Future, 51 DUKE L.J.
1397, 1399 (2002) (criticizing Choie’s desire to refocus regulation on investors rather than market
professionals).
175.
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in the expected level of those cash flows will impact the stock price, while
news that does not matter to investors’ views about cash flows will not
impact the stock price. Thus, there is a direct link between what is material
to an investor and the way that a stock price responds to a disclosure of
information in an efficient market. Unfortunately, that link does not
necessarily hold if the market is not efficient.182
Thus, the ex post/ex ante problem resides as well with assessing decisions about
disclosure based upon the likelihood that that information will affect the efficient
market. While this assessment links primarily to causation and reliance, it in
essence invokes a materiality analysis as to market affect.183 Judging any ex ante
decision on disclosure is difficult to isolate after the ex post market movement or
lack of movement has occurred.184 Significance may enter into this conundrum,
with materiality assessing the significance and/or materiality of market
movement.185 Indeed, the standard cited in Merck is difficult to comprehend other
than as an entirely ex post judgment that retroactively determines materiality at the
ex ante disclosure decision based on the significance of any subsequent market
movement.

182.

Dunbar, supra note 156, at 507–08.
See id. at 468 (“[O]ne can ask the economic question of how a change in investors’ decisions to trade at
a given price could be observed. The straightforward answer is that if the information would cause more
investors to want to buy at a particular price, the previous supply-and-demand equilibrium would be upset and
the price would have to rise until the demand for the stock once again equaled its supply. This, of course, says
that materially positive news causes a stock’s price to rise. If the information is not material, then investors’
decisions to buy or not are unaffected, and the previous supply-and-demand equilibrium will still hold.
Therefore, there is an economic equivalence between information material to investors’ decisions to buy and
sell and the price of a security.”).
184. Id. at 508 n.199 (“If underreaction is a general phenomenon, then news that will ultimately impact the
stock’s price may sometimes turn out to have an understated impact in the short run, with the implication that
some material news will have such an understated impact that the associated price movement is not statistically
significant. Therefore, by examining only the short-run impact of the response to certain news, one would
erroneously misclassify some material information as immaterial. To the extent that there is short-run
overreaction, then the reverse would be true: some news that is generally immaterial would be erroneously
classified as material by looking at the excessive short-run price movement.”).
185. Id. at 509 (“The other half of the story is the possibility that immaterial information causes a sharp
decline in the price of an individual stock or an entire sector of securities. The definition of immaterial
information in this analysis is that it is already known or, as before, it does not have a statistically significant
effect on stock price in an efficient market. When the market is not efficient, however, the normal conditions
for interpreting the valuation component of an event study are not present. If investors are not basing their
price forecast on future cash flows alone, but instead they are, for example, herding after others or responding
to momentum in the price, immaterial information about the issuer of the security may well have a significant
effect on the price.”).
183.
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III. Conclusion
Materiality is an element of crucial importance in finding violations of Rule 10b5.186 The Supreme Court’s Matrixx decision rejected a bright line standard equating
statistical significance with materiality, and in doing so, passed not only on an
opportunity to define a bright line standard apropos of statistics in pharmaceutical
class actions, but also on the opportunity to provide more than a tautological
definition of the element of materiality generally.187 Other Supreme Court and
circuit court usage of significance indicates that significance, while a term central in
case law defining materiality, has essentially been employed tautologically, with
only some nuance.188
Circuit court usage of significance ranges from that of pure definition or
synonym; to meanings of importance, degree or amount, near certainty, probability
and fact based actual significance—all uses having a clear lineage in Basic and back
to TSC and Mills.189 Matrixx has reinforced the legitimacy of this general usage, but
has not furthered any clarity in such usage.190 Until further clarity comes, usage of
significance is likely to be recited in finding materiality, but remains tautological
and subject to conclusory judicial finding.
The concern with ex post judgment on assessing the legality of ex ante disclosure
or non-disclosure under Rule 10b-5 is a concern that many understand to be
inherent in the nature of the elements of a 10b-5 private action.191 This problem is
not likely to go away. Nor is it likely to be solved by the usage of forms of
significance in finding materiality.
This discussion should call to our attention the use and the limits of language,
particularly forms of significance, in fleshing out the rather amorphous element of
materiality. Perhaps it may also contribute to greater care in avoiding the pitfalls of
hindsight and applications of the fraud-on-the-market theory with greater attention
to the ex post/ex ante problem.
We could do better by emphasizing the probability magnitude test component to
the standard set out in Basic. This affirmed portion of the circuit court split that
Basic addressed seems to have been slighted, if not buried, by the use of significance
and the ubiquitous “reasonable investor” “total mix” language.192

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.4.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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The Second Circuit’s In re ProShares Trust Securities Litigation,193 together with a
few other circuit opinions, which have made at least a passing reference to the
test,194 show that emphasizing the probability magnitude language better captures
the predictive notion of ex ante decision making about what is material and what
need be disclosed.
We need a standard more measurable than “significant.” Rather than offering a
mere tautology, a re-emphasis of the probability magnitude test phrasing would
give better guidance and would direct the courts toward a careful assessment of
facts that would contribute toward developing a more definite ex ante, if not bright
line, standard.

193. 889 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 728 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2013). See also Stratte-McClure v.
Morgan Stanley, No. 13–0627–CV, 2015 WL 136312, at *7 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2015) (finding that in a securities
fraud claim the plaintiff must allege, in part, that the omitted information was material under Basic’s
probability/magnitude test).
194. See supra Part II.A.3.
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